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i. introduction
Th e thought of the German philosophers Friedrich Schleiermacher1 and Wilhelm 
Dilthey2 is oft en assessed and criticized according to the interests and standards 
of twentieth- century philosophical hermeneutics. Th is common yet increasingly 
questioned account is misleading insofar as these two authors have divergent 
research agendas, approaches, and contexts, including the notion of hermeneu-
tics itself, from each other as well as from later hermeneutical philosophy.3
 1. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (November 21, 1768–February 12, 1834; born in 
Breslau, Silesia; died in Berlin) was educated at Moravian Brethren institutions in Niesky 
and Barby (1783–87), and the University of Halle (1787–90). His infl uences included Fichte, 
Herder, Kant, Plato, Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, and Spinoza, and he held academic appoint-
ments at the University of Halle (1804–1807) and University of Berlin (1810–34).
 2. Wilhelm Dilthey (November 19, 1833–October 1, 1911; born in Biebrich am Rhein, Hesse; 
died in Siusi allo Sciliar, Italy [Seis am Schlern, South Tyrol]) was educated at the Universities 
of Heidelberg and Berlin (DPhil., 1864). His infl uences included A. Boeckh, K. Fischer, 
Hegel, Kant, John Stuart Mill, L. v. Ranke, Schleiermacher, and F. Trendelenburg, and he 
held appointments at the Universities of Basel (1866–68), Kiel (1868–71), Breslau (1871–82), 
and Berlin (1882–1905).
 3. On the inadequacy of Gadamer’s approach to Schleiermacher, see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics 
and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2003), 183–219; “Th e Philosophical Signifi cance of Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics,” in 
Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Jacqueline Mariña (ed.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 75; and my “Schleiermacher on Language, Religious 
Feeling, and the Ineff able,” Epoché 8(2) (Spring 2004). On the problematic character of 
Gadamer’s reading of Dilthey, see my “Disturbing Truth: Art, Finitude, and the Human 
Sciences in Dilthey,” theory@buff alo 11 (2006): 121–42. Bowie argues that these distortions 
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Schleiermacher and Dilthey are frequently mentioned together as representa-
tives of nineteenth- century hermeneutics and hermeneutical philosophy. Th is 
portrayal is problematic given the historical breaks and philosophical diff erences 
between their positions, and the more limited sense of the term “hermeneu-
tics” in their writings. Despite Schleiermacher’s formative infl uence on Dilthey, 
and the centrality of Dilthey’s interpretation of Schleiermacher to his subse-
quent reception, there are crucial diff erences between them. Schleiermacher’s 
thought occurs within the context of the modern appropriation and transfor-
mation of traditional metaphysics and Protestant theology. His basic point of 
departure is the felt intuition of the infi nite in his early Romantic works and the 
feeling of absolute dependence on God in his mature academic works. Th e latter 
claim is not only a religious and theological one. Th e prerefl ective feeling of God 
replaces the Cartesian cogito in grounding both knowledge and metaphysics in 
his Dialectic, and is the only locus of certainty in the face of skepticism.4
In contrast with Schleiermacher, whose thought he helped to revive and rein-
terpret, philosophy took an epistemic, social- historical, and social- scientifi c 
turn in Dilthey. Instead of asserting the unity of the world and the sciences, of 
being and knowledge, Dilthey developed an epistemic pluralism or nonreduc-
tive empiricism in relation to knowledge, and moderate skepticism in response 
to metaphysics.5 Without the inherent unity of nature and spirit as an object of 
knowledge, Dilthey diff erentiated the natural and human sciences according to 
their contexts, methodologies, and objects. Even if all sciences involve previous 
processes of interpretation and meaning- formation, insofar as knowing is never 
free of presuppositions and a larger human context of signifi cance, the human 
sciences are concerned with self- experiencing and self- interpreting individuals 
and groups for whom the fi rst- person perspective of relations of meaning is – 
at least in part – performatively constitutive of practices or how they act and 
do not act.6
Th e distance between these two authors can be further seen in their attitude 
toward metaphysics and ancient Greek philosophy. Schleiermacher belonged 
begin with Dilthey and become canonical in Gadamer in a note to Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
Hermeneutics and Criticism, Andrew Bowie (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), xxxiv–xxxv. Hereaft er cited as HC followed by the page number.
 4. Gunter Scholtz, Ethik und Hermeneutik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995), 239.
 5. On Dilthey’s empiricism without doctrinal empiricism, or “Empirie, nicht Empirismus,” see 
my “Empiricism, Facticity, and the Immanence of Life in Dilthey,” Pli: Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy 18 (Spring 2007): 108–28.
 6. Rudolf A. Makkreel notes how interpretation in the human sciences involves reinterpreta-
tion of previous interpreted realities in Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 152; on the priority of practice in Dilthey, 
see my “Interpreting Practice: Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Historical Life in Dilthey,” 
Idealistic Studies 38(1–2) (2008).
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to the generation of early German Romanticism that was more empirically 
and realistically oriented than German idealism. He remained committed to a 
revised form of Platonic metaphysics, infl uenced by his engagement with early 
modern and German idealist philosophy, and translated the works of Plato 
in an infl uential German edition still in use today.7 Dilthey, however, inter-
preted modernity – prefi gured in thinkers such as Augustine, who opened up 
the fi rst- person perspective of already meaningful individual lived- experience 
(Erlebnis) in contrast to impersonal objective structures of classical ontology 
– as an irrevocable break with premodern forms of thought, which included 
Schleiermacher’s dialectics.8 While dialectic was the central philosophical disci-
pline for Schleiermacher, to which hermeneutics was subordinate, epistemic 
logic in the context of the fullness of social-historical life played the primary 
role for Dilthey.9 In conjunction with his organic and vitalist yet still causal 
conception of the universe, Schleiermacher was a post- Kantian thinker of reli-
gious transcendence and of the ethical ideal of the highest good that informs 
and orients ordinary life.10 Dilthey was a philosopher of experiential imma-
nence, as he reformulated the Kantian project as a “critique of historical reason” 
in his early work Introduction to the Human Sciences. Th ere Dilthey describes 
a critique of historical reason as “a critique of the capacity of man to know 
himself and the society and history which he has produced.”11 Schleiermacher’s 
faith and intuition of the divine lose their priority as they become one way of 
expressing lived- experience, mood, and worldview, and infi nity is transformed 
into an immanent yet self- interrupting characteristic of life itself that does not 
necessarily entail a transcendent God.12
 7. On Schleiermacher’s revised Platonism and his translations of Plato, see Julia A. Lamm, “Th e 
Art of Interpreting Plato,” in Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Mariña (ed.), 
91–108.
 8. Scholtz, Ethik und Hermeneutik, 243.
 9. Ibid., 236–7.
 10. God is transcendent and the world is an immanent organic whole for Schleiermacher, who 
transformed Spinoza’s metaphysics in an individualistic and vitalistic direction oriented by a 
transcendent God and the highest good as the realization of individual personality. Compare 
the discussion of these issues in Frederick C. Beiser, “Schleiermacher’s Ethics,” in Cambridge 
Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Mariña (ed.), esp. 61, 65, 67, 69.
 11. Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof 
Rodi (eds), Michael Neville (trans.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 165. 
Hereaft er cited as IHS followed by the page number. Michael Ermarth pursues this central 
thread in Dilthey’s works in Wilhelm Dilthey: Th e Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978).
 12. On the argument that Dilthey secularized the feeling of God into the feeling of life, moving 
from the feeling of faith to a more general “refl exive awareness” (Innewerden), see Scholtz, 
Ethik und Hermeneutik, 240, 250–51.
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ii. schleiermacher: language, psychology, 
and interpretation
Friedrich Schleiermacher led an intellectually and publicly active life as a 
Romantic literary fi gure, reformed pastor, theologian, university teacher and 
administrator, public intellectual, and political reformer.13 Th e son of a reformed 
clergyman, he was educated by the Moravian Brethren, who advocated a strict 
devotional Pietism, and subsequently at the more liberal University of Halle 
where he continued his studies of early modern and Enlightenment era philos-
ophy and the classics. He is well known for his youthful associations with 
German Romantic literary circles14 and the celebration of religion as an intuition 
and feeling of the universe and the infi nite in early writings such as On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, and he is also noted for being the primary 
proponent of liberal Protestant theology in his mature theological works such 
as Th e Christian Faith.
Schleiermacher’s writings concerning hermeneutics are all based on lecture 
courses and lectures, and consequently have a fragmentary character. Th ey 
continue and transform the early modern Protestant and Enlightenment trends 
in hermeneutics from the eighteenth century, which are primarily concerned 
with the interpretation of biblical and classical texts as well as related to rhetoric 
and Aristotelian logic.15
Hermeneutics is a doctrine of art (Kunstlehre) oriented according to the idea 
of understanding given the universality of misunderstanding, which is caused by 
hastiness or prejudice (HC 23). For Schleiermacher, non- or misunderstanding 
is the ordinary condition, and understanding needs to be pursued in order to be 
achieved.16 Th at is, where the laxer practice of hermeneutics assumes that under-
standing is automatic and misunderstanding to be avoided, “[t]he [stricter] 
practice assumes that misunderstanding results as a matter of course and that 
understanding must be desired and sought at every point” (HC 21–2). As in 
Kant, the practice of art is not the doctrine of science, nor does art deductively 
or mechanically apply rules and method.17 Art can never be solely based on 
 13. Th is section refi nes my interpretation in “Schleiermacher on Language,” 297–312.
 *14. For a discussion of German Romanticism, see the essay by Daniel Dahlstrom in Th e History 
of Continental Philosophy: Volume 1.
 15. Matthias Jung, Hermeneutik zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junias, 2001), 46.
 16. Ibid., 59.
 17. See Hans- Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall 
(trans.), 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989), xxiii. Compare my discussion of the distinc-
tion between art and science in Kant and Schleiermacher in “Moral and Political Prudence in 
Kant,” International Philosophical Quarterly 44(3) (September 2004), 307, and “Schleiermacher 
on Language,” 299–300.
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rules insofar as this involves the infi nite regress of always needing another rule 
to apply a rule. Art requires judgment or a sense of appropriate application that 
is cultivated. Kant clarifi es this distinction in the Critique of Judgment: whereas 
science demands determinate judgment, which subsumes a particular under a 
concept, art calls for refl ective judgment, which articulates the general from the 
particular – that is, without a pregiven rule.18
Art is not the imposition of science on tradition or system on the life- world 
for Schleiermacher. Art originates in ordinary experience itself. It is always 
already at work in ordinary understanding to the degree that even the child is 
engaged in the art of hermeneutics in language acquisition.19 Because there 
is no rule for how to apply a rule, art is a practice of a fi nite sensuous being. 
Method alone is inadequate for Schleiermacher and Dilthey, since it is the 
cultivation of a sense already at work in everyday communication and as such 
it requires lived- experience.20 Although the goal of truth or correctness is an 
important one in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, as Dilthey noted, art and 
imagination characterize all knowing (HSH 695). Cognitive representation is 
indispensable to the work of the sciences. Yet it is not itself primary since it is 
always based on prior feeling. Schleiermacher is consequently already engaged 
in a critique of a purely representational model of knowledge. Schleiermacher 
insisted on the priority of feeling in understanding the human agent and, as 
we shall see, the receptivity and responsiveness of the imagination in inter-
preting others through their expressions, which is the medium of understanding 
and interpretation.21 To this extent, one strength of “Romantic” hermeneutics 
– in contrast with its impersonalist opponents – is its recognition of the role of 
feeling, desire, and aff ectivity as part of linguistic interaction, interpretation, and 
 18. For an examination of this distinction and its implications see Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination 
and Interpretation in Kant (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
 19. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: Th e Handwritten Manuscripts, James Duke and Jack 
Forstman (trans.), 2nd ed. (Atlanta, NJ: Scholars Press, 1997), 49, 52; hereaft er cited as HHM 
followed by the page number. Compare Bowie’s discussion of interpretation and language 
inquisition in Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 207–8.
 20. Wilhelm Dilthey, “Das hermeneutische System Schleiermachers in der Auseinandersetzung 
mit der älteren protestantischen Hermeneutik,” in Gesammelte Schrift en (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), vol. 14, 605; published in English as “Schleiermacher’s 
Hermeneutical System in Relation to Early Protestant Hermeneutics,” in Selected Works, vol. 4, 
Hermeneutics and the Study of History, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (eds), Th eodore 
Nordenhaug (trans.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); hereaft er cited as HSH 
followed by the page number in the German Gesammelte Schrift en, which appears in the 
margins of the English translations in Dilthey’s Selected Works. Dilthey critiques rule- based 
hermeneutics in HSH 710.
 21. Jung, Hermeneutik zur Einführung, 64.
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individuation.22 Schleiermacher and Dilthey do not segregate the subjective, 
psychological, or emotional dimensions of interpretation from their linguistic 
and social- historical contexts.23
Hermeneutics, according to Schleiermacher, is the art of understanding. 
Understanding is an art to the extent that it is neither fully reducible to nor inde-
pendent of the application of rules (HC 6). Hermeneutics is an art, concerned 
with language, through which we interpret texts and indirectly understand 
others. Th is art has three levels operating between the minimum degree of refl ec-
tion in ordinary common discourse and the maximum degree of interpretative 
and refl ective eff ort in approaching classical or original texts (HC 13): that is, 
(i) the everyday prerefl ective use and interpretation of language; (ii) the skilled 
interpretation of language; and (iii) the refl ective interpretation of language. 
Hermeneutics, which does not constitute the whole of philosophical, theolog-
ical, and scientifi c inquiry for Schleiermacher, is concerned with understanding 
only as it occurs through language: “Language is the only presupposition in 
hermeneutics, and everything that is to be found, including the other objective 
and subjective presuppositions, must be discovered in language” (HHM 50).
Dilthey unfolded in his work Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutical System in 
Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics of 1860 how herme neutics is essen-
tially concerned with language. Further, language and language acquisition 
have, for Dilthey, an interpretive character from the beginning (HSH 745). 
Accordingly, hermeneutics shares the structure – both the limits and possi-
bilities – of language. If language is always already related to what cannot be 
said, then the incommunicable does not occur only as a limit for hermeneutical 
understanding but as a condition that cannot be sublimated and thus positively 
defi nes the tasks of interpretation. Th e object of understanding demands that 
it be understood immanently from out of itself and accordingly that the one 
addressed be receptive to the claim being made.24
 22. In Hermeneutics and Criticism (HC 93), Schleiermacher associated divination – as receptivity 
to others and their individuality – with the feminine, and the comparative approach – empha-
sizing universality – with the masculine. Philosophers and men tend to one- sidedly stress 
their own thoughts in approaching others (HC 6, 93, 135). Julie Ellson analyzed the “herme-
neutics of desire” and its gendered character in Schleiermacher, who oft en ethically and 
aesthetically privileges the feminine, and in Romanticism in Delicate Subjects: Romanticism, 
Gender, and the Ethics of Understanding (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
 23. Bowie demonstrates how divination in Schleiermacher is not the emotional- psychological felt 
projection of Einfühlung, yet misses the expressive- linguistic and social- historical character 
of interpretation in Dilthey in Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 207.
 24. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die Religion (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1969), 28; published in 
English as On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, Richard Crouter (ed. and trans.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Th is connection between responsiveness and 
immanence is further developed by Dilthey – for example, in the thesis that life needs to be 
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Th e further claim that hermeneutics is the art of understanding “the utterance 
fi rst just as well and then better than its author” seeks to bring to consciousness 
what remained unconscious in the author (HC 23). Th is task is driven by the 
absence of any immediate knowledge of what is within an author (ibid.), and 
indicates, as Dilthey noted, the need in interpretation to consider the unthought 
of an author (HSH 707). Articulating the unconscious in consciousness follows 
the hermeneutical model of receptively determining the indeterminate through 
interpretation (HC 33, 49), and of bringing to concepts the sensual and precon-
ceptual sources of language (HC 34–8). For Schleiermacher, and to the chagrin 
of Karl Barth and neo- orthodoxy, even the divine word of the Bible is available 
only through interpretation (HC 41). Inspiration and enthusiasm cannot elimi-
nate the need for contextualization and mediation in order to articulate God’s 
word (HC 82). Owing to the potential infi nity of interpretation, as both past 
origins and future possibilities and transformations are not directly given, and 
“because it is an infi nity of past and future that we wish to see in the moment of 
the utterance,” hermeneutics is an infi nite or “endless task” that no synthesis or 
fusion can overcome (HC 23, 31).
In addition to the interpretation of language that Schleiermacher called 
“grammatical,” there is also “psychological interpretation” involving receptive-
ness to the traces of the singularity of the other as they are indicated in commu-
nication. As Dilthey argued in his reading of Schleiermacher, the individual and 
the singular would be lost in a discourse that denies the possibility of psycholog-
ical interpretation (HSH 717–18). Individuals do not only instantiate a pregiven 
language, and even as the individual is placed within a general location and 
context, it is irreducible to it (HC 279). Language is used and created through 
the language- forming power and style of individuals, such that it is inadequate 
to consider language purely in propositional or structuralist terms. Th e emphasis 
on psychological understanding is subsequently not so much the correct repre-
sentational reproduction by the interpreter of some “mental content” of the 
author. Th e “psychological” concerns the individual side of interpretation just 
as “grammatical” concerns the structural and more universal side of linguistic 
mediation as a relational system (HC 8–9, 67). Although psychological inter-
pretation has priority from the perspective of the individual and grammatical 
from the perspective of language as a systematic impersonal whole, both sides 
are equal and necessary for interpretation (HC 10). Both varieties of interpre-
tation, which are ends of a continuum rather than contraries, are needed, as 
propositions can be interpreted in relation to individual life- acts, linguistic 
systems, and the provisionally and indeterminately given whole of a life that is 
articulated from out of itself – and by Heidegger (circa 1920) in describing the hermeneutics 
of facticity as the self- articulation of life in its enactment.
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the intersection of both moments.25 Th ey are a spectrum and yet each side has 
to be grasped in its own terms as one transitions between the grammatical and 
the psychological without either one being complete or suffi  cient in itself and 
without there being determinate rules for how these transitions can be accom-
plished (HC 10–11).
Schleiermacher’s approach is no mere “external reconstruction” aiming at 
correctness, as Gadamer contended.26 It is oriented toward the question of 
truth through receptivity to what addresses and claims us, as hermeneutics is 
constructive in order to envision an organic whole (HC 65). Schleiermacher 
also noted the integrating and mediating character of language. Although he 
emphasized the unifying and conforming power of language and tradition, 
Schleiermacher showed the importance of linguistic transformation such as in 
the artist of language who each time individualizes language anew (HHM 49), 
and in the language- forming power of the new and the individual (HC 12, 86).
Schleiermacher’s approach to language emphasized the diff erences that occur 
in relation to the identity of language; that is, with that which diff erentiates 
languages and, further, with that which resists and withdraws from linguistic 
mediation. Hermeneutics concerns language, which is the only presupposition 
and defi nes the scope of hermeneutics (HHM 50). Yet language is not a system 
that can close itself to what is other than language in a pure immanence of 
linguistic integration or mediation. Despite the limits that language and its inter-
pretation impose, such limits cannot eliminate the infi nity of sense, such as the 
infi nite signifi cance of a book such as the Bible, or the relation of the fi nite to 
the infi nite (HHM 53, 55). Th e incommunicable confronts language on the side 
of both the whole and the individual.
Jean Grondin has emphasized the quest for the whole understood as 
completeness in Romantic hermeneutics.27 Yet the whole is not so much a 
complete system as it is an infi nity of intercrossing relations that are ultimately 
referred to the nonrelational. In this way, Dilthey characterized three senses of 
“whole” in Schleiermacher’s thought: (i) organizing inner form, (ii) system, and 
(iii) relational context or Zusammenhang (HSH 679). Whereas organizing inner 
form refers to an organic immanent teleology and the idea of a system points to 
the completeness of a totality, Zusammenhang indicates the nexus or contextu-
ality that allows singularity to be interpreted in relation to the infi nite. If there 
is a common quest in “Romantic hermeneutics,” it is characterized more by the 
question of the singular and the ineff able than it is by the systematic complete-
 25. Th is is an implication, for instance, of HC 18–19, 92.
 26. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 165–9; Scholtz, Ethik und Hermeneutik, 124.
 27. Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1994), 64.
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ness of representational knowledge. Dilthey could therefore suggest that indi-
viduality is the form of the whole (HSH 709). If we could know the whole, then 
we would know the whole in its concrete singularity rather than as a universal 
or concept.
If Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics emphasized the correctness of an under-
standing to be guided by the theoretical articulation of an art and practice, this 
is far from meaning that he presupposed correctness as the sole model of truth, 
since interpretation calls for responsive feeling and imagination. Nor does this 
imply that the world is inherently and fully comprehensible and intelligible, 
since as fi nite beings we relate to the infi nite through what Schleiermacher called 
in various places traces and seeds (Spuren und Keime). Th e notion of trace or 
seed is helpful for interpreting its use in Schleiermacher and the paradox of 
speaking about that which cannot be spoken. Th e trace is that which is given 
as not being able to be given, the presence of that which cannot be thought as 
presence, the disclosure of nondisclosedness, the revelation of that which is 
concealed as concealed.28 Th is trace does not stand alone as a brute singularity 
or fact, since it bears a fundamental relationship to the word for Schleiermacher.
iii. dilthey: interpretation and the human sciences
Wilhelm Dilthey was a philosopher, intellectual and cultural historian, and 
social thinker, who is most recognized for his contributions to hermeneutics, 
the human sciences, aesthetics and literary criticism, interpretive psychology, 
and what later became known as “life- philosophy” (Lebensphilosophie). As 
with Schleiermacher, the hermeneutical tendencies of Dilthey’s thought, which 
concerned understanding and interpretation as epistemic and social- historical 
phenomena, should be placed in the larger context of Dilthey’s project.
Dilthey’s primary early work Introduction to the Human Sciences (1883) is 
an attempt to develop a postmetaphysical epistemology of the human sciences, 
without positivistically truncating human experience, by systematically and 
historically investigating “the whole of human nature as it is revealed in expe-
rience, in the study of language, and in the study of history, and thus seek the 
connection of these components” (IHS 51). Dilthey developed his analysis of 
the human investigation of the human world in the context of his early episte-
mological project of explicating “the empirical without empiricism” in order to 
 28. One of the few thinkers to explore Schleiermacher’s appeal to the “trace” in the context of 
recent literary theory is Werner Hamacher; see his “Hermeneutic Ellipses: Writing the Her-
meneutic Circle in Schleiermacher,” Timothy Bahti (trans.), in Transforming the Hermeneuti-
cal Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy, Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift  (eds) (Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press, 1990).
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unfold a “critique of historical reason” that would clarify, validate, and extend 
the distinctive forms of inquiry of the human sciences in the context of social- 
historical life (IHS 165).
Th e human sciences can be grounded only through immanent self- refl ection 
on experience, based in and interpreting the “feeling of life” or precognitive 
refl exive awareness, which includes epistemological and psychological inquiry 
(IHS 174, 227–8). Dilthey argued for a nonreductive experientialism in epis-
temology, which expanded it beyond cognitive or theoretical knowledge and 
hence transformed it. According to Dilthey:
All science is experiential; but all experience must be related back to 
and derives its validity from the conditions and context of conscious-
ness in which it arises, i.e., the totality of our nature. We designate as 
“epistemological” this standpoint which consistently recognizes the 
impossibility of going behind these conditions. (IHS 50)
In his critique of reductive forms of empiricism and positivism, Dilthey argued 
for the irreducible richness and variety of experience understood and articulated 
from out of itself. Experience is bound to meaning- relating activities and struc-
tures that are only understandable in their life- context (Lebenszusammenhang). 
Dilthey utilized this account of lived- experience to reject traditional and spec-
ulative metaphysics. Metaphysics conceives the world through a unifi ed point 
outside the world, assumed to be inherently intelligible, in order to represent 
the world as a systematic totality. Metaphysics separates knowledge from its 
historical context and the “totality of human nature,” whereas what is called 
for is “historical refl ection together with epistemological self- refl ection 
[Selbstbesinnung]” (IHS 52).29
In his Life of Schleiermacher (1870) and Introduction to the Human Sciences, 
Dilthey interpreted the processes of life immanently and in relation to a dynamic 
context that is never fully visible. Th is “inner” perspective of life implies the 
original givenness from the fi rst- person perspective of co- agents or participants 
of meaningful social- cultural structures and processes. “Inner” thus refers to the 
fi rst- person life- context, which is inherently bodily, perceptual, and worldly as 
well as social- historical, and in which objects are preconceptually “understood.” 
In contrast, “outer” or “external” refers to the abstraction of objects from their 
life- nexus in the third- person perspective of observation and explanation char-
acteristic of modern natural sciences (IHS 61–2, 67). Without the metaphysical 
unity of the world, which has collapsed into paradox and aporia, we are faced 
 29. On life- refl ection (Besinnung), see Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 
376–80.
hermeneutics:  schleiermacher and dilthey
149
with incommensurable data derived from myriad sources that cannot be conclu-
sively combined insofar as they are explained and interpreted phenomenally 
and immanently from out of themselves rather than related to an external stan-
dard (IHS 61–4).Although Dilthey is repeatedly misinterpreted as an idealist 
philosopher of spirit or an epistemological dualist, radically opposing causal 
explanation of nature from the interpretive understanding of human life, the 
incommensurability of the natural and human sciences does not exclude their 
overlapping or pluralistic employment in inquiry: “Knowledge of the natural 
sciences overlaps with that of the human sciences” (IHS 70). Accordingly, 
for instance, the human sciences are irreducible to causal explanation even 
as they continue to use it. Th ird- person causal and structuralist-functionalist 
approaches in the human sciences, which analyze persons as the results of 
previous natural causes or as the tools and mechanisms of greater social forces 
and structures, are legitimate for Dilthey to the extent that they can be related 
to the perspective of persons as conscious co- agents involved in the formation 
of social life (IHS 55). Social forces, structures, and processes are in turn neces-
sary for interpreting and explaining the phenomena associated with “spirit” in 
German idealism, including the individual person, groups, eras, and nations 
(IHS 56, 58). Nature as a causal order conditions individual and social life, just 
as that life in turn impacts and reshapes nature (IHS 69). History cannot be 
understood except through its natural conditions and as the “domination of 
nature” that is a primary purpose of human social activity from agriculture to 
technology (IHS 71).
Pluralism is necessary for the human sciences given their distinctive kinds of 
objects: “the external [or structural] organization of society, the cultural systems 
[of the reproduction of meaning] within it, and individual peoples” (IHS 93). 
Th e latter is the most complex object, since it does not correspond to an entity 
insofar as there is no such thing as a soul, organism, or essence to a nation or 
people (IHS 55, 121). Dilthey rejected what is now called “strong holism” in the 
philosophy of the social sciences, that is, the assertion of the existence of collec-
tive entities, while retaining a role for a “weak holism” that allows statements 
about collective or group phenomena such as an era, generation, or nation. 
Dilthey’s focus on the context of individual life thus diff ers from the method-
ological individualism that reduces individuals to the ahistorical self- interested 
monadic agents of rational choice.
Th e primary intention of the human sciences is the empirical description of 
individuality in its life- context. Consequently, in an argument that would arouse 
neo- Kantian criticism insofar as they excluded psychology from the cultural 
sciences in classifying it as a natural science, the human sciences require descrip-
tive and empirical psychology (IHS 109). Psychology is not then purely a natural 
science, as it involves purposes, norms, and values, as seen, for instance, in 
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ethical, legal, and other practically oriented claims. Th e individual presents itself 
as both the goal and limit of understanding, which is explicative through the 
expressions and practices of the individual rather than directly intuited or intro-
spected, as individuality evades full disclosure and articulation.30 For Dilthey, we 
oft en know expressions that have a kind of objectivity for understanding while 
being uncertain of the life being expressed.31
During his middle period from 1883 to 1896, Dilthey focused on developing 
his aesthetics and a descriptive and interpretive psychology, including his argu-
ment for the “acquired psychic structural nexus” from the tension and diff eren-
tiation of self and world in the experience of resistance via refl exive awareness to 
the fullness and specifi city of an individual life. In this context, Dilthey articu-
lated the lived – or performatively enacted rather than purely transcendentally 
constitutive – “categories of life” or life’s immanent articulation- character that 
proved so signifi cant for the early Heidegger.32 Th e acquired psychic nexus indi-
cates the complexity of overlapping functions of the individual as it develops in 
a historical situation. Dilthey’s “proof ” of the external world through the expe-
rience of resistance indicates the thereness and co- givenness of self and world.
Dilthey’s writings from the early 1890s should be interpreted in the context of 
his articulation of an interpretive psychology occurring in the space and intersec-
tion of epistemology and life. In his Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vom Ursprung 
unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Außenwelt und seinem Recht (1890), Dilthey 
formulated the basis for such a project by arguing for a phenomenality or imma-
nence prior to the intellectualism of phenomenalism and for the independence 
of reality from the subject through the resistance and tension of the co- givenness 
of self and world. Under the traditional guise of an argument for the “external” 
existence of the world, Dilthey would radicalize this canonical epistemological 
problem by anticanonically showing the bodily- worldly character of human life. 
Th is work suggests a hermeneutics of bodily being in the world that provides 
the basis for interpretive psychology. Epistemological categories have their basis 
in the bodily- perceptual and social- historical character of life. Categories such 
as substance and cause are derived from the pre- intentional and prerefl ective 
categories of life through which the world is experienced and expressed.33
 30. On the explicative character of understanding, see Jung, Hermeneutik zur Einführung, 84.
 31. Ibid., 86, 88.
 32. Wilhelm Dilthey, Th e Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Selected 
Works, vol. 3, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (eds), Rudolf A. Makkreel et al. (trans.) 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 228–45; hereaft er cited as FHW followed 
by the page number; Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 381–91.
 33. Compare Frithjof Rodi, Erkenntnis des Erkannten: zur Hermeneutik des 19. und 20. Jahr-
hunderts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990), 159.
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Schleiermacher’s “hermeneutical circle” is a model of education or cultiva-
tion. As one moves between the particular and general, each movement enriches 
one’s previous understanding (HC 24). For Dilthey, it is the unending and irre-
ducible intersection of and movement of prerefl ective elementary understanding 
and refl ective interpretation between self and other, individual and context, and 
singular and whole. Th is dynamic of the determinate and the indeterminate is 
productive of understanding, which is practical rather than theoretical, selec-
tive rather than universal, and productive rather than merely reconstructive.34 
Understanding attempts to move from the exteriority of the utterance to the 
internal fi rst- person perspective of the speaker or writer.35
In the fi nal phase of his work, from 1896 until his death in 1911, Dilthey 
focused on the hermeneutical and social character of sense and meaning in the 
context of Hegel’s objective spirit, which signifi es the constitution of intersub-
jectivity in and through human practices and products. Dilthey analyzed histor-
ical life in Th e Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences (1910) 
through the relation of lived- experience (Erlebnis), expression (Ausdruck), and 
understanding (verstehen). He further articulated a “philosophy of worldviews” 
in order to account for the genesis and confl ict of systems of interpretation of 
meaning in relation to the feeling and nexus of life. Worldviews express the 
tendency to unify experience even as the confl icts (Widerstreit) inherent in life 
prevent the closure of life in conceptual systems, since they inevitably face their 
limits in the antinomies and aporias generated by life itself.
It is in this late period that Dilthey explicated the experiential structures 
of consciousness in his three preliminary “Studies toward the Foundation of 
the Human Sciences,” his exploration of the import of the productive systems 
of historical life for knowledge in Th e Formation of the Historical World in the 
Human Sciences, and his fi nal and perhaps best formulation of hermeneutics in 
“Th e Understanding of Other Persons and Th eir Manifestations of Life.” While 
Rudolf Carnap and others utilized the word Aufb au in the sense of epistemic 
“construction,” Dilthey stressed the formation- character of both the human 
sciences and the historical reality that they investigate.36 Th at is, the formation 
 34. Jung, Hermeneutik zur Einführung, 83.
 35. Wilhelm Dilthey, Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik, in Gesammelte Schrift en, vol. 5, 318–19; 
published in English as Th e Rise of Hermeneutics, in Selected Works, Vol. 4: Hermeneutics and 
the Study of History, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (eds), Fredric R. Jameson and 
Rudolf Makkreel (trans.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); hereaft er cited 
as HSH followed by the page number in the German Gesammelte Schrift en.
 36. On Dilthey’s signifi cance for the early Carnap, particularly on metaphysics as a feeling of life 
and worldview, which Carnap employed in his critique of Heidegger, see Gottfried Gabriel, 
“Introduction: Carnap Brought Home,” in Carnap Brought Home: Th e View from Jena, S. 
Awodey and C. Klein (eds) (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2004), 3–20.
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of the historical world refers to its articulation in the human sciences, which 
themselves theoretically refl ect this historical world (FHW 1). Dilthey’s theory 
of the human sciences is not merely an epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie) in the 
conventional sense, but a theory of knowledge (Th eorie des Wissens) that relates 
knowing to its context. Whereas epistemology seeks to establish the foundations 
of conceptual cognition (Erkenntnis), Dilthey places the epistemology of the 
human sciences within a larger context of the knowledge (Wissen) embodied in 
social practices and historical forms of life.
Th ought can and does generalize, intensify, and transform life, even as it 
remains bound to the factical and empirical context of that life (FHW 27). 
Knowledge encompasses not only the conceptual cognition of reality, but also 
the values and purposes established concerning it. It is inevitably selective 
and bound to a perspective. Dilthey accordingly situated the human sciences, 
which are determined by their respective object and how the object is given, in 
relation to a pretheoretical life- nexus and its forms of elementary or ordinary 
understanding (FHW 38). Th ese are tied up with the temporality, historicity, 
and structures of social life; with an epochal “objective spirit.” Objective spirit 
indicates the ways in which the past has been objectifi ed and continues to shape 
contemporary practices, and it is analyzed in the human sciences as cultural 
systems and the external organization of society.
A signifi cant characteristic of the Formation of the Historical World is the devel-
opment of the notion of “productive system or nexus.” Wirkungszusammenhang 
suggests a historical effi  cacy or productivity prior to any analysis of it as either 
causal or teleological (FHW 4). Th e human sciences involve the study of 
dynamic interconnected systems that articulate the intersection of meaning, 
value, purpose, and force. Dilthey interpreted these temporally, such that 
meaning primarily concerns how humans are determined by their past, value is 
based on their present feeling of life, and purpose is projective striving into the 
future in the face of productive forces (Kräft e) that cannot always be predicted 
or controlled.37
Understanding, which should be construed verbally as “to understand” 
(verstehen), is intrinsically interpretive for Dilthey. Since human agents are 
conscious and refl ective beings who are bound to the facticity of their bodies 
and world, they can cognize themselves and others only indirectly through 
expressive and interpretive means (FHW 108). Given that we know ourselves 
and others primarily through actions, life- expressions, and their eff ects – rather 
than through introspection or intuition – and that everyday understanding can 
 37. Heidegger’s portrayal of the unity of the temporal ekstases is in part a response to temporality 
in Dilthey. See Ilse Nina Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Study of 
History and Culture (Th e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff , 1980), 172.
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face breakdowns and what seems distant or strange, elementary understanding 
leads to higher forms of understanding and interpretation; that is, hermeneutics. 
Dilthey’s project of a critique of historical reason proceeds from the context of 
life in all of its complexity and concreteness to the conceptual cognition of the 
sciences and, fi nally, to refl ective awareness (Besinnung). Th is refl ection is made 
possible by the prerefl ective refl exivity (Innesein or Innewerden) of the human 
subject and, with its double meaning of “sense” (Sinn) as meaning and bodily 
awareness, constitutes the basic movement of Dilthey’s thought. Understanding 
is not merely subjective but mediated through the expressions and practices of 
human life. It also provides more than a scientifi c access to objects; it is funda-
mentally world- opening (FHW 226).
Understanding aims at truth or validity, and such understanding is described 
as being the most complete (FHW 227). Yet understanding is also concerned 
with the contextuality and facticity of human expressions. Th e objectifi cations 
of human life in practices and institutions, in behaviors and expressions, are 
the medium through which we understand and interpret others and ourselves. 
Dilthey’s phenomenological descriptions of kinds of attitude (Verhaltungsweise), 
taking a stance (Stellungsnahme), and life- concern (Lebensbezug) show how 
historical life is both about and matters to the individual in its relational context 
(FHW 2). Th e human sciences justifi ably strive to this extent for objectivity, 
universality, and truth.
Objectivity in the human sciences links lived- experiences with the social- 
historical structures that inform them. Yet this objectivity cannot consist of a 
mimetic copying of reality “as it is” (FHW 23). Th e human sciences relate the 
unique, the accidental, and the momentary to the nexus of norms, values, and 
meanings operative in social- historical reality. Th ey explicate the intersection of 
the unique and the general in the “historical presentation of the singular occur-
rence [die historische Darstellung des einmal Geschehenen].”38 Th e signifi cance 
of the singular in relation to its context indicates that Dilthey’s concern is not 
exclusively epistemological or scientifi c. It is practical, and the human sciences 
cannot extricate themselves from this non- “value- free” context. Possibilities 
for historical vision need self- refl ection (Selbstbesinnung) if we are to be truly 
responsive to our own hermeneutical situation.
 38. Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufb au der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaft en, B. 
Groethuysen (ed.), 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), 3, my translation.
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iv. hermeneutics and philosophy in 
schleiermacher and dilthey
Th e word “hermeneutics” retained its early modern meaning and function in 
the writings of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Although they intermittently gave 
the word more extensive meanings, hermeneutics is principally the art of under-
standing another’s utterance through interpretation (HC 3–5). Hermeneutics is 
one discipline among other disciplines, correlated in particular with its fellow 
philological discipline of criticism as the art of evaluating the authenticity of texts 
rather than a style of philosophizing as a whole (HC 3).39 It is further subordinate 
to ethics, which concerns any form of human activity, and dialectic – or the art 
of thinking – for Schleiermacher.40 Hermeneutics refers to the exegesis of texts 
or, more broadly, communicative utterances in terms of their sense and meaning. 
Whereas earlier Protestant and idealistic hermeneutics stressed the “spirit” of 
the text, Schleiermacher and Dilthey focus on the individuality, personality or 
style, and sensibility of the author in his or her historical context.41 Despite this 
more limited use of the word hermeneutics, their thought has been retrospec-
tively designated as “hermeneutical” owing to their interest in associated issues 
of sense and meaning, context and historicity, understanding and interpretation, 
and in the communicative and explicative dimensions of human life and inquiry.
Even given this potential continuity through issues of interpretation, their 
responses to such issues are distinct. Schleiermacher and Dilthey emphasized the 
central role of language in hermeneutics and inquiry but they did not minimize or 
neglect the material- empirical, social- historical, and biographical- psychological 
dimensions of human life and knowledge. Th e art of interpretation is the art 
of understanding communication, involving the refl ective and philosophical 
elaboration of understanding, within a larger context of intellectual and empir-
ical inquiry. Twentieth- century hermeneutics – beginning with Heidegger’s crit-
ical reception of Dilthey in the 1920s – is largely hostile to these merely ontic 
empirical, historical, and psychological moments in Schleiermacher and Dilthey. 
Where later hermeneutically defi ned philosophy stressed the integrating power 
and truth of language, narrative, and communication to disclose, construct, and 
mediate the world through basic concepts such as linguisticality (Gadamer), 
narrativity (Ricoeur), and mutual consensus (Habermas), Schleiermacher and 
 39. Compare Jung, Hermeneutik zur Einführung, 72; Scholtz, Ethik und Hermeneutik, 235.
 40. On the ethical and dialectical context of hermeneutics, note Schleiermacher, HC 8. One fl aw 
of the twentieth- century hermeneutical reception of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is that it 
ignores its context in his dialectic, the art of thinking in conversation that is the basis of both 
ethics (to which hermeneutics belongs as a variety of human activity) and physics. On the 
dialectical context of hermeneutics, also see Bowie, “Th e Philosophical Signifi cance,” 76.
 41. Jung, Hermeneutik zur Einführung, 56.
hermeneutics:  schleiermacher and dilthey
155
Dilthey emphasized not only the linguistic character of thought and the disclo-
sive power of language but also its reversals, limitations, and breakdowns. Since 
everything cannot be said in language given the confl ict, facticity, and resistance 
constitutive of life, and language is as much evocative as representational, all the 
resources of indirect communication are needed in order to articulate the singu-
larity and aff ective life of the individual, on the one hand, and the complexity of 
any given context or nexus (Zusammenhang) of relations, on the other.
Besides the inability to fully determine or signify the individual and the 
whole in language, which calls forth and demands the interpretive oscillation 
and circling between them, communication and interpretation were confounded 
and inspired by the transcendence and ineff ability of God in Schleiermacher and 
the unfathomable and ungroundable immanence of life in Dilthey.42 Th is fi ni-
tude and facticity in relation to the infi nite beyond in Schleiermacher, or infi -
nite empirical plurality in Dilthey, orients their intellectual endeavors.43 Instead 
of being directly or immediately disclosed to intuition or reason, phenomena 
require interpretation, which indirectly addresses, articulates, and indicates the 
singular and complexly mediated phenomena of human existence. Given this 
context, the work of interpretation is tied to empirical scientifi c research.
Th e need for refl ectively informed interpretation emerges when elemental or 
ordinary everyday understanding is confounded by that which is not commu-
nicated or understood – whether it is a text (the domain of traditional herme-
neutics), the author, other persons, the historical context, life itself, or God. As 
there is no absolute diff erence between the transcendental and the empirical, 
or the ontological and the ontic, interpretation cannot be purely philosoph-
ical. Whether in Schleiermacher’s dialectic or Dilthey’s epistemic logic, philos-
ophy thinks through scientifi c inquiry and cannot be separated from it without 
dogmatism. It accordingly cannot avoid or bracket empirical and ontic inquiry 
into the anthropological, natural, psychological, and social- historical dimensions 
of human life. Whereas traditional hermeneutics is primarily concerned with the 
explication of biblical and classical texts, understanding and interpretation are 
increasingly associated  – already in Schleiermacher to a lesser degree, and for 
Dilthey more centrally – with the fi rst- person participant perspective of lived- 
 42. On Dilthey’s notion of life and its epistemic role, see my “Self- Refl ection, Interpretation, 
and Historical Life in Dilthey,” Dilthey International Yearbook for Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences, vol. 1 (2010), and “Impure Phenomenology: Dilthey, Epistemology, and Interpretive 
Psychology,” Studia Phaenomenologica 10 (2010).
 43. On facticity in nineteenth- and twentieth- century European philosophy, see the introduc-
tion to François Raff oul and Eric Sean Nelson (eds), Rethinking Facticity (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2008), 1–21. On Dilthey as a thinker of fi nitude, see Jos de Mul, Th e Tragedy of Finitude: 
Dilthey’s Hermeneutics of Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
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experience (Erlebnis), epistemic and social- historical refl ection (Besinnung), and 
the empirically oriented inquiry of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft en).
It is striking that Schleiermacher and Dilthey conceive of interpretation as 
aiming both at the individual and the singular and at the context and the whole 
in their relational interdependence. Understanding and interpretation occur to 
one degree or another as an oscillation between these two poles, as universality 
demands returning to particularity and particulars require universalization in 
order to begin to be recognized and understood. Th e oscillation between the 
conceptual and the nonconceptual, the universal and the particular, and the 
individual and the whole became characterized as the “hermeneutical circle,” 
which Schleiermacher adopted from Friedrich Ast.44 Rather than being a closed 
system or hierarchy of meanings, where particulars are subsumed under univer-
sals never to be heard from again, interpretation occurs through both contex-
tualization and individuation. It is a potentially infi nite iteration of departure 
and return to its object. Similar to empirical research, interpretation is provi-
sional and can always begin anew as more is learned about the individual and 
the context.
Interpretation is not only the analysis of language, narrative, or communi-
cative action for Schleiermacher and Dilthey; it concerns “meaning” in all its 
potential guises and expressions. Th is includes the disruption and incomplete-
ness of meaning in encountering “non- meaning” and the counter- purposive. 
Th is insight is related to the role of the nonconceptual and prerefl ective in expe-
rience, the aff ectivity and emotional character of lived- experience and under-
standing, and the priority of music and art as expressions of human life. Instead 
of highlighting reason or intuition alone, they emphasized the need to address 
human existence in its fullness and variety, which embraces rationality and aff ec-
tivity, refl ection and the basic “feeling of life” (Lebensgefühl).45
Meaning is “holistic” in the sense of its being relational and interconnected. 
Yet, in contrast with visions of an impersonal systematic integration in a concep-
tual or social totality, or the “occult subordination” of every aspect of the text 
to an esoteric doctrine (HC 17), this is an open- ended, interpretive, and “fi rst- 
person” holism that is constantly referred back to the experience and interpre-
 44. Friedrich Ast (1778–1841), one of the leading philologists of the nineteenth century, initially 
formulated the circle in Section 78 of his Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik, 
published in 1808, as Schleiermacher himself noted (HHM, 195). See Ronald Bontekoe, 
Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996), 8, 23.
 45. On Lebensgefühl from Kant’s third critique to Dilthey, see Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Th e Feeling 
of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life- Philosophy,” Dilthey- Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaft en III (1985).
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tation of individuals.46 Even as the individual is in a sense fundamental, the 
interpretation of the individual leads back to the context and the potentially 
universal through the comparative, the generalizable, and the typical. Both the 
individual and the whole are more or less indeterminate, as interpretations 
attempt to increasingly articulate their determinateness.47 In this process, both 
sides change, readjust in relation to one another, and are reinterpreted.
Th e provisional character of interpretation does not only hold for the inter-
pretation of other humans. Self- understanding is more complex and question-
able than is usually thought, as the self does not have direct or self- certain access 
and knowledge of itself. Self- knowledge consequently proceeds through self- 
interpretation, with all the risks that this involves. Th e individual does not have 
direct or unmediated self- knowledge, much less an intuitive self- transparency, 
as evident in biographical and autobiographical writing. Th e motto of Dilthey’s 
unfi nished multivolume biography of Schleiermacher is “the individual is 
ineff able.”48 Rather than being statically given as an unalterable boundary, or 
posited as being outside interpretation, the unsayable occurs in the context of 
communication.49 It is owing to fi nitude and alterity that all words and expres-
sions call for interpretation and assessment – whether they are our own or even 
those of God. Andrew Bowie notes that Schleiermacher’s self “is not an absolute 
point of beginning”; the self is infi nitely refl ective and interpretive, as it lacks 
presence to itself and at the same time needs to respond to this lack.50
Meaning is inevitably of “diverse provenance,” or pluralistic.51 It involves a 
multiplicity of elements and sources that entail, for example, addressing and 
researching the text, the author, the context, and the truth claims of a work in 
order to interpret and evaluate it. Th ese myriad elements and resources cannot 
be eliminated prior to the work of interpretation, even as some are highlighted 
and others remain in the background, depending on the interpretive task. 
Hermeneutics is methodologically pluralistic in drawing on both generalizing 
(linguistic) and individualizing (psychological) tendencies, which exemplify the 
 46. Jung discusses the “holism of the fi rst- person perspective,” which also diff erentiates the 
human from the impersonal third- person perspective of the natural sciences, in Hermeneutik 
zur Einführung, 76.
 47. On the diff erence between an indeterminate and a determinate whole, and the necessity for 
contextualization in making an utterance more determinate, see HC 28–30.
 48. Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers: Auf Grund des Textes der 1. Aufl age von 1870 und 
der Zusätze aus dem Nachlaß, M. Redeker (ed.), in Gesammelte Schrift en (Göttingen: Van-
denhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), vol. 13, 1; also note HSH 330.
 49. Scholtz, Ethik und Hermeneutik, 111, 125.
 50. Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 249.
 51. Th is is a key point of contention for Heidegger in Einleitung in die Philosophie (Gesamtausgabe 
27), 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2001), 347–9. On Heidegger’s critique and Misch’s 
defense of Dilthey’s meaning pluralism, see Frithjof Rodi, Erkenntnis des Erkannten, 137–40.
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two primary tasks of hermeneutics for Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Likewise, 
ordinary life is diff erentiated by a diversity of practical interests, and scientifi c 
inquiry by its objects and how they are approached.
v. criticisms and conclusions
Despite the incorporation of many of their insights by philosophers as diverse as 
Heidegger and Habermas,52 a number of overlapping critiques of Schleiermacher 
and Dilthey emerged in reaction to their thought. Owing to their concern with 
the psychological and aesthetic dimensions of human existence, some critics 
accused them of “psychologism” and “aestheticism,” that is, the reduction of 
truth or validity claims to psychological dispositions and the overprioritizing 
of art as a model of human activity.53
Likewise, on account of their attention to the historical nexus or context in 
which individuals and groups live, act, and produce, they were criticized to varying 
degrees for “historicizing” texts and experiences in a way that threatened their 
truth or cognitive validity; for example, the truth of the Bible (by Orthodox and 
neo- Orthodox theological critics of Schleiermacher such as Barth54), the sciences 
(by positivism and logical positivism), philosophy (twentieth- century hermeneu-
tics55), or the very idea of validity itself (by Neo- Kantianism and Husserl).
Finally, because of their accentuation of the ineff able, individual, and aff ective 
aspects of human life and on the epistemology, methodology, and rationality of 
philosophical and human scientifi c inquiry, opponents of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey – especially Gadamer – have criticized their works for being incoherently 
beholden to positivistic scientism and Romantic aestheticism, Enlightenment 
rationality and the irrational affi  rmation of God or life.56 Nonetheless, insofar 
as philosophy does not one- sidedly abandon refl ection or feeling, reason or 
 *52. For a discussion of Heidegger’s hermeneutic theory, see the essay by Daniel L. Tate in 
Th e History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 4. Habermas’s relation to hermeneutics is 
discussed in essays by Christopher F. Zurn and Wayne J. Froman in Th e History of Continental 
Philosophy: Volume 6.
 53. On the role of art and aesthetics, and a response to the aestheticism charge, see Nelson, 
“Disturbing Truth,” 121–42.
 *54. For a discussion of Barth’s theology, see the essay by Felix Ó Murchadha in Th e History of 
Continental Philosophy: Volume 4.
 *55. Twentieth- century hermeneutics is discussed in detail in the essays by Daniel L. Tate in Th e 
History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 4 and Wayne J. Froman in Th e History of Continen-
tal Philosophy: Volume 6.
 56. Hans- Georg Gadamer, “Wilhelm Dilthey nach 150 Jahren: Zwischen Romantik und Positivis-
mus,” in Dilthey und Philosophie der Gegenwart, E. W. Orth (ed.) (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1985), 
and Hermeneutik in Rückblick (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 9, 186.
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imagination, science or art, or universality or individuality, their work continues 
to be signifi cant in elucidating a nonreductive interpretive experientialism in 
both knowledge and practical life.
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